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ABSTRACT
This comment analyses the Panel report and finds that its main diagnosis is correct: Canada's
BERD is low. The Panel report is fairly silent about the necessary improvements to Canada's
innovation system. This comment suggests that while Canada's tax credit for R&D and
Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) are useful programs, they need to be
complemented by other direct incentives that may help small technology firms to cross the
"valley of death", complete proof of concept and become eligible to venture capital. The US
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, imitated by Japan, is the best model
for such an incentive and Canada should consider its adoption.
THE STUDY Innovation and Business Strategy:
Why Canada Falls Short produced by an expert
panel under the auspices of the Council of
Canadian Academies is a well-researched and
well-presented report on innovation in the
Canadian private sector. The authors were
asked to examine the innovation performance
of Canadian firms and the factors behind this
performance. They conclude that Canadian
business is characterized by a lacklustre innova-
tive business-sector performance on many
accounts.
The main diagnosis of the report is correct:
Canadian business is lagging in terms of innova-
tion and productivity. The gap or shortfall
appears in business expenditure on R&D
(BERD) which is low compared to other OECD
countries and declining. It also shows itself in
low levels of private investment on information
and communication technologies as well as on
machinery and equipment. It can also be seen in
labour productivity figures, and in the limited
number of large high-technology firms which
are Canadian-owned and -controlled. In addi-
tion, foreign control and imported technology
in important industries such as automobile and
chemicals allow Canada to produce cars or basic
petrochemicals with little R&D. The panel’s
conclusions are straightforward: Canada needs
to increase its BERD in both total absolute
terms and relative to sales or gross domestic
product (GDP).
The report is well documented with excellent
data and theoretical inputs from different cur-
rents without being excessively prone to jargon.
It is easy to read for any person acquainted with
the subject.
Commentary
It is impossible to analyse in a few pages the
many different and relevant issues and topics
covered in the report. I am thus going to con-
centrate on one, which appears to be one of the
most important themes in the study: how to
grow large Canadian-owned and controlled
companies.
1 The author holds the Canada Research Chair on the Management of Technology in the Department of Manage-
ment and Technology at the Université du Québec à Montréal. Email: jorge.niosi@uqam.caINTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 81
The report shows that Canadian-owned mul-
tinational corporations (MNC) are those with
the highest BERD intensity (BERD/GDP), fol-
lowed by foreign MNC. Canadian-owned local
firms are in third place. It states “Canada’s fail-
ure to develop a greater number of innovative
Canadian-based multinationals has been a key
contributor to the country’s overall R&D weak-
ness.” (p.60).2 The question, thus, is how can
Canada nurture its technology-based companies
to grow MNC.
Canada’s BERD intensity has declined since
the peak attained in 2001 during the technol-
ogy boom (Chart 4). At the same time, BERD
intensity has increased in most other OECD
countries including Australia, Austria, the
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Spain, and Turkey, as well as in
non-OECD countries such as China, Chinese
Taipei and Singapore (OECD, 2007). And this
is not all: the present economic and financial
crisis, as well as the coming demise of Nortel,
will accelerate the downward trend of Cana-
dian BERD in the years to come. Meanwhile,
Finland, Korea, Singapore and Sweden are
pulling ahead of the pack. 
Among the determinants of business innova-
tion strategy, two deserve to be analysed: the cli-
mate for new ventures and public policy. The
report finds that the Canadian climate for new
ventures is good, but not outstanding; Canadian
venture capital is confined mostly to seed stages,
and is declining. Moreover, angel investment is
reduced compared to US figures (p. 62). Canada
has its share of new technology-based firms; yet
these do not grow, but are instead either
acquired by Canadian or foreign firms, or disap-
pear fairly soon. Public policy is not helping
either. 
Using an institutional benchmark approach, a
closer examination at some of our more dynamic
competitors may allow us to find the appropriate
solutions.
Policy Cures for Business Diseases
 The Nordic (mainly Finland and Sweden) and
Southeast Asian states (China, Chinese Taipei,
Japan, Korea and Singapore) are very proactive
in the field of science, technology and innova-
tion (STI).3 Since the 1990s, these governments
have launched many STI initiatives that are
bearing fruit in terms of new firms, new clusters,
etc. Also, these governments invest more than
the Canadian government on support for new
firms (OECD, 2007). The more proactive orien-
tation of some governments is briefly mentioned
in the report. It is important to emphasize that
the belief that business and markets know better
than governments is being shaken these days,
when so many large companies request public
funds in order to survive; such a market-prone
belief was never taken seriously in Northern
Europe or Southeast Asia. Today one may say,
under the light of the present crisis, that market
foresight and wisdom have been much exagger-
ated, and the era of Keynesian governments is
back. In order to catch up with Nordic and
Southeast Asian leaders, and avoid being left
behind in the productivity race, Canada’s federal
and provincial governments need to increase
their direct funding for business R&D, which is
too low, at present, and declining (Chart 8). In
particular, direct funding of R&D has remained
fairly stagnant in absolute terms.
An Accurate Diagnosis
The report is entirely accurate in asserting
that our lacklustre business innovation perfor-
2 All chart, table and page numbers refer to the accompanying article by Peter Nicholson.
3  Among other studies see Ahlback (2005) for Finland, Chung (2002) for Korea, Parayil (2005) on Sin-
gapore, Casper and Whitley (2004) on Germany, Sweden and the UK, and Jan and Chen (2006) for Chinese
Taipei. Also, see the Science and Technology Policy Council of Finland (2006).82 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
mance is not primarily related to the production
and attraction of human capital, or to a lack of
scientific production (my figures in Niosi (2008)
coincide with Chart 2). Canada is able to spin off
many technology-based firms from academic
institutions and public laboratories. A large part
of the problem seems to be linked to the coun-
try’s limited capacity to grow these new technol-
ogy-based firms. These firms are either bought
out in software but also in biotechnology, and
their managers spend a good part of time look-
ing for funds abroad (Veilleux, 2008), or simply
collapse.4 Market size and geographic fragmen-
tation of the Canadian market are certainly an
issue (p. 62), but this is not the extent of the
problem. Canadian firms need more govern-
ment support. Canadian government funding
and government funding for innovation needs to
increase, not only because of the small market
size and fragmented domestic market in Canada,
but also because governments in other countries
(including the United States, Finland, Japan and
Korea) are doing more and doing it better. US
policy to support technology-oriented small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) is discussed below
as an illustration of what one major country is
doing to foster business innovation. 
A Useful U.S. Federal Program for 
Innovative SMEs
 The report correctly points out that the pub-
lic policy environment for innovation in Canada
consists mainly of the Scientific Research and
Experimental Development Tax Incentive.
However, there are many other incentives in the
United States that do not exist in Canada. In
1982, the Small Business Innovation Research
Program (SBIR) was created in the United
States through the Small Business Innovation
Research Act. It is administered by eleven gov-
ernment agencies, but five federal departments
represent 96 per cent of the program. The five
agencies are the Department of Defence (DoD),
the Department of Energy (DoE), the National
Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), and the
National Science Foundation (NSF). The small-
est among the five big components of SBIR, the
NSF SBIR annual budget is now US$100 mil-
lion. SBIR has been evaluated several times and
found extremely useful in generating knowl-
edge, creating networks between small firms and
universities, creating and disseminating intellec-
tual capital, and moving technology from uni-
versities towards the market (Wessner, 2007).
Also, a high proportion of SBIR projects
resulted in new products and processes. Today,
SBIR allocates US$2 billion per year to fund
R&D projects by small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SME). By law, the eleven participating
federal agencies contribute 2.5 per cent of their
budgets to SBIR. SMEs can apply for a $750,000
non-reimbursable grant in two phases to exam-
ine the commercial feasibility of academic or
public R&D technology. SBIR is considered a
milestone program, as evidenced by Japan’s
copying of it in 1998 (Japan SBRI, 2008). SBIR
is not the only program supporting small tech-
nology-based firms in the United States. Other
similar programs include the Advanced Tech-
nology Research Program (ATP) (Wessner,
2001) and the Small Business Technology Trans-
fer Program (STTR). 
Successful State Programs for SMEs
It is not only federal programs that support
technology-based SMEs in the United States.
The state-based Pennsylvania’s Ben Franklin
4  One third of the 100 largest Canadian software firms in the 1990s and early 2000s were acquired by foreign
corporations (Chagnon, 2007). Alias Research (Toronto), Cognos (Ottawa) and Softimage of Montreal are
among the most remarkable cases in software. Allelix (Toronto), Biochem Pharma (Montreal) and ID Biomedical
(Vancouver) are among the biotechnology firms. One half of the 1,000 biotechnology firms that were once
incorporated in Canada have disappeared since 1980.INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 83
Technology Partnerships Program, created in
1986, the Maryland Technology Transfer Fund,
and others in different states are useful comple-
ments to the above-mentioned federal pro-
grams. The report accurately suggests that the
poor performance of business services in Canada
explains a great portion of the US-Canada
BERD intensity gap (Table 1 and Chart 5).
Computer software design and services, and sci-
entific R&D services are among them and they
represent the vast majority of SMEs. These
firms would be among the main beneficiaries of
a Canadian SBIR program, and Ben Franklin-
type provincial programs. 
Fund Starvation
 I suggest that the major factor behind the
poor growth performance of Canadian new
technology-based firms is fund starvation. In
order to have large Canadian-owned and -con-
trolled multinational corporations, it would be
necessary to financially support these SMEs.
The solution may be the renewed engagement
of Canada’s federal and provincial governments
in the backing of new technology-based firms.
Compared to most OECD countries, and South
East Asian emerging nations, the Canadian gov-
ernment spends too little on business innova-
tion. In order to improve the innovative
performance of our business system, the federal
and provincial governments need to spend more
in support of technology in Canadian smaller
firms. 
Conclusion
The report is a useful tool for our understand-
ing of Canada’s innovation system. It underlines
the diminishing role of Canadian governments
in the support of business innovation. However,
it falls short in terms of public policy recom-
mendations.
When confronted with the risk and uncer-
tainty represented by R&D and innovation,
the business sector tends to reduce its invest-
ments in such fuzzy areas. Business innovation
thus needs to be given incentives from gov-
ernment, in the form of tax credits for R&D,
direct subsidies, as well as technology transfer
programs from universities and government
laboratories. For several decades, Canada was
at the forefront of the design and implementa-
tion of STI policy. Canada’s tax credit for
R&D is considered one of the world’s most
progressive and successful programs, as is the
Industrial Research Assistance Program
(IRAP), launched in 1962, and managed by the
National Research Council (NRC). The last
surge of such policies, mostly oriented to
stimulate university R&D, took place around
the year 2000, with the launching of the Cana-
dian Foundation for Innovation, Genome
Canada and the revamping of the Medical
Research Council into the Canadian Institutes
for Health Research. More recently, however,
after the technology bubble, governments
have reduced their investment in these key
business areas, and the private sector has been
left virtually unto itself. It has responded by
curtailing BERD, and a significant number of
Canadian technology-based SMEs have been
acquired or went bankrupt.
In order to renew its set of STI policies for
industrial R&D, Canada should examine suc-
cessful incentives around the world. I suggest it
examine such programs as ATP, STTR and
SBIR, and contemplate launching a new pro-
gram, similar to SBIR. This program might be
run by Canada’s most experienced public sector
STI managers, namely those running NRC’s
IRAP. For that purpose, the federal government
should increase NRC budget by 2.5 pr cent to
build the first block of a SBIR program.5 Then,
after evaluation and fine-tuning, the program
could be extended to other government depart-
ments, with the addition of new funds. The
Canadian SBIR program should amount to84 NUMBER 18, SPRING 2009 
C$200 million (or one tenth of the US pro-
gram). Eventually, the federal government
should study the possibility of creating other
national programs similar to the American ones.
Provincial governments should study the Ben
Franklin Technology Partnership Program and
the several others inspired by Pennsylvania’s ini-
tiative.
Building policy is slow and needs continuous
evaluation and fine-tuning (Niosi, 2000, 2002,
2003 and 2005, Becher and Khulmann, 1994,
Feldman and Link, 2001). Such an experimental
program needs to be assessed and eventually
enlarged in three to four years. 
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